Tuesday, November 15, 2011

High-quality vs. Low-quality People


As a budding geographer, I love to read about how spatial arrangement affects politics (one familiar example to most Americans is "the red states versus the blue states" spatial pattern in US presidential elections). Luigi Tomba is one of my favorite political scientists because his research on China includes an analysis of spatial relationships, especially of residential segregation, to describe political phenomena in China. As The China Beat frequently posts book reviews, I was inspired to post an article review with my own commentary, experiences, and pictures.

Tomba's article "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community: Civilization and the Middle Class in Urban China" is absolutely brilliant. His articles are always well written with fluidity, vivid imagery, and even a little humor, qualities that are usually hard to find in academic journals. This particular article takes common rhetoric—the notion that there is a need to create a more civilized Chinese society—and analyzes it in the context of segregation, urban governance, and political reform.

Tomba argues that the government is not just encouraging its citizens to become more civilized (wenming, 文明) and is not just sitting back to let market reform take its course. Rather, he writes, the state is "actively promoting the engineering of new, diffused, and responsible economic elites."[1] The creation of such a responsible and consumption-driven class is crucial for the CCP in maintaining political legitimacy on the road towards a more capitalist system. As a result, Chinese cities have been intentionally segregated between the haves and have-nots, with the haves enjoying political autonomy within their gated communities (xiaoqu, 小区 ) that such rich, educated citizens "deserve." Meanwhile, the have-nots remain dependent on the government-controlled Resident Committees (jumin weiyuanhui, 居民委员会) and exercise little to no political rights. For example, rich citizens enjoy homeowners' rights, while the poor don't dare to dream of owning a home.

How is the government actively taking part in the creation of this so-called socially responsible and consumption-driven upper middle-class? First of all, the Chinese state encourages its citizens to be more civilized through extensive public signage. You can see this everywhere you go in China, from the toilets that say, "Be civilized, flush the toilet"; to the jumbotrons that flash, "Welcome the 2014 Youth Olympics to Nanjing! Let's build a civilized city"; to the bus and subway signs that read "Ride a civilized bus, Move to the back" or "Ride a civilized subway, form a line and let people get off before you get on"; to the signs that warn "Don't litter! Let's a build a clean city we can all enjoy as one urbanite family." This type of language is so common in China that you become numb to it after a while. Here is an example: 


This is a bus stop sign that reads:
Lighten up and make this ancient city green by planting trees and flowers; Prepare a new and beautiful Nanjing
Abide by social ethics; Protect and uphold the appearance of our urban environment
Love deeply (literally "hot love") Nanjing; Launch new construction in Nanjing; Beautify Nanjing; Promote a prosperous Nanjing
Share one blue sky together; Construct a new homeland together

Build an elegant environment; Live a longer life

We can use voluntary actions to replace the current situation with extreme cleanliness

Create a civilized city; Ride a civilized bus; Be a civilized person




Tomba argues that this government rhetoric is an intentional civilizing project that is attempting to promote a sense of responsibility amongst Chinese citizens to create a socially stable society—all in hopes to maintain the legitimacy of the Party. I remember talking about the self-responsibility of a citizen with my friend Gao Min over lunch one day. He was talking about how most Chinese people don't have enough responsibility for their community yet. For example, this is why there is so much litter on the streets, because people just don't care about their community and their country enough to pick it up. The government, to remedy this deficiency in its citizens, is trying to increase the self-responsibility of the economic elitists to maintain social stability during its transition to a market economy.

Underlying the idea of creating a more civilized society is the idea that the inner-quality (suzhi, 素质) of the Chinese people needs to be improved. Suzhi literally means "element quality," but it is translated as inner-quality, character, qualification, disposition, fiber of your being, basic essence, and constitution. Chinese people love to talk about suzhi, and one of the most common ways I hear it during my recent conversations with people (inside and outside of Old Nanjing) is: "Americans have better suzhi than Chinese people do." What they mean is that they think Americans are more civilized and are of better quality and constitution than Chinese people. Toilets, traffic laws, pedestrian right-of-way, spitting, quality of education, garbage collection, democracy, control over stray dogs and cats, freedom of speech, self-responsibility, independence, individualism, and public welfare are all examples that Chinese people have given me as to why Americans supposedly have higher suzhi than Chinese people. Why is responsibility and suzhi so important? Because the CCP needs the middle-class to have high enough suzhi to have a sense of responsibility to contribute to social order, not to disrupt it.

Tomba argues that the government is intentionally trying to raise the suzhi of the middle-class in an intentional orchestration to create a self-responsible middle-class that can exercise political autonomy and maintain social stability, and thus extend the political legitimacy of the CCP beyond a "normal" length in a market economy. Tomba argues that segregated zoning patters and flexible urban governance patterns according to each zone's wealth are all a part of the Chinese efforts to extend the political legitimacy of the Chinese government. 

Tomba argues that there are three ways the government has taken an active role though public policy in promoting the self-responsibility of the middle-class and creating a system that favors the rich: 1.) A household registration system (hukou, 户口) that restricts access to the best education, welfare, and housing to urban residents, 2.) Housing reform policies that encourage zoning patterns based on wealth, and 3.) The policy that allows political autonomy within the gates of privately owned residential compounds (小区) that allow homeowners to enjoy relative political freedom and independent decision making through homeowners' committees (also known as YWH, 业主委员会).The key word there is homeowners: those that cannot afford to buy a house are excluded from this privilege.

I will focus on the second and the third strategy. First, about the zoning patterns based on consumption ability: During the Mao Zedong era, Chinese cities were arranged according to work unit (danwei, 单位), which at the time played a major role in centralizing the planned economy. Each work unit created their own housing, childcare, schools, clinics, and post offices, among other public services. Most importantly, the work unit assigned individuals to living quarters and provided food in centralized cafeterias. 

Chinese cities have undergone a complete transformation of urban space and governance since the policies of reform and opening began in 1978. During the 1990s, household income, rather than the work unit, began to determine residence, which resulted in the popularization of new private residential compounds. According to Tomba, the semi-privatization of housing in China has resulted in socio-segregated zoning policies: "Both official rhetoric and popular discourses justify a different arrangement of social spaces, by placing those with better suzhi [inner quality] on a higher step of the civilization ladder."[3] The result is the expansion of gated communities, rapid expansion into the suburbs, and sections of inner cities "becoming dilapidated and 'colonized' by migrants and lower-status urban residents."[4] As a result, cities are segregated such that the rich, or those with responsibility to govern themselves, live in completely different parts of the city from the poor, or those with no such responsibility. 

At the same time, the role of Resident Committees (the government administration at the neighborhood level) has declined in importance in middle- and upper-class neighborhoods. Tomba argues that this socio-spatial differentiation determines how communities are governed: the "high-suzhi" practice self-responsibility and exercise political autonomy through participation in homeowners' organizations. The "low-suzhi", on the other hand, depend on the Resident Committees for government services, such as the distribution of subsidies and welfare. 

Second, in regards to political autonomy within private housing compounds. The rich engage in exciting and hip grassroots political reform by participating in homeowners' committees that promote and protect their rights to own dogs, plant flowers, and have multiple garages. They exercise not only their political rights, but also their self-governance within their gated, private residential compounds. Urban self-governance within the context of middle-class residential compounds lies under the assumption that those with high-suzhi are responsible enough for self-governance. The low-suzhi, however, are not so responsible. They are forced into dilapidated inner-city areas with no such political autonomy or participation. This differentiation on social and political spaces reinforces the hierarchy of the high-suzhi being placed at a higher level on the social totem pole than the low-suzhi

Official rhetoric supports this social hierarchy and intra-urban social, spatial, and political differentiation because the high-suzhi will, ideally, continue to support the Chinese government under this divided spatial pattern. Meanwhile, the goal of the present government regime is to raise more people's suzhi such that they can exercise greater political autonomy, contribute to social stability, and increase their consumption rate in a time of transition to a market economy. Tomba argues that the creation of a self-governing and responsible middle-class is essential for the continuation of CCP control in the transition to a capitalistic society.[5] One way this is manifested is in residential segregation that favors the high-quality people.

Tomba's article concludes by saying: "In terms of governance, this situation leads to increasing autonomy in the spaces inhabited by the middle class, while the potentially dangerous 'weak groups' [low-suzhi] remain in need of political patronage and maintain their dependence on the state. For example, residential communities, by defining discrete units of socialization, contribute to classifying the population into 'high-suzhi' clusters (those who are able to govern themselves) and 'low-suzhi' clusters (those in need of state patronage). Different communities are also governed differently: the rich enjoy higher levels of autonomy and self-governance."[6]  Deliberate government policy, especially the hukou restrictions, zoning patterns, and homeowner committees, intends to promote the legitimacy of the CCP in a market society amongst the rich and educated though political differentiation according to segregated residential areas. 

How is this related to my research? While most of the existing literature concentrates on the trendy homeowner grassroots political movements of those with high-suzhi, I am pursuing research on those with so-called low-suzhi in Old Nanjing. Questions I am examining during my ethnographic research include: How has the role of government changed in the lives of the low-suzhi people during the urban restructuring of the past thirty years and what affect does this have on political activism and social behaviors? How does socio-segregation influence the role of state control in low-suzhi urban society? The people of Old Nanjing, with some exceptions, are incredibly ashamed of their low-suzhi. While they pride themselves in their history, they frown at China's backwardness and feudal-like society. Meanwhile, the Resident Committee in Old Nanjing is an active part of neighborhood life and many of the residents think very highly of them as serving their community and resolving disputes between families. Answers to complicated questions like these take time, and I am looking forward to continuing my research on this subject in the coming months, and publishing their stories here. 

How is the rhetoric on civilization and suzhi manifested in everyday life? For example, Chinese Presdient Hu Jintao's signature ideology is to build a harmonious society, and such a harmonious society has been the backbone of his political career. Tomba argument is that Hu Jintao's efforts to build a harmonious society are accompanied by a project to literally reorganize urban space into self-governing, harmonious communities. These self-governing communities are limited to those with high-suzhi, of course. Tomba quotes a People's Daily article that states: "Self-government is possible only where there is an economic base and sufficient economic capacity to guarantee consumption and continuous development. [It is] therefore not suitable for poorer areas."[7] I personally have no doubt the people of Old Nanjing would agree. "We need the Resident Committees to solve our familial and neighborly disputes. We are so poor in this slum and do not have good suzhi," one 32-year old resident told me. 

I've personally witnessed this social phenomenon many times in my daily conversations. One day I was eating noodle soup by myself and struck up a conversation with the middle-aged woman, Yang Hongyan, and her 13-year-old son sitting across from me. Auntie Yang remarked about skyrocketing property values, inquired about my own family's home value ("Houses in America are SO cheap, aren't they?"), and earnestly asked me with searching eyes if her 13-year-old's English was standard or not. With furrowed brows, she confessed, "I want him to go to America for university, but I'm afraid his suzhi is not high enough." I suppressed a laugh, and asked her, "Why are Chinese people so concerned about suzhi?" She just replied, "He might not do well in school if I'm not there to force him to do his homework."

Another example came up one day during the 5-minute break in the middle my Urban Development Social Theory class, when there was a fierce debate between one lone female student, Wang Xinyi, and the rest of the class. She thought it was unfair that the Chinese intelligentsia looks down on the street sweepers, the recycling collectors, the migrant workers, and other general laborers. She protested that it was especially unfair the way Chinese people automatically judge, look down, and essentially are disgusted by migrant and low-class workers, who "use their hands instead of their brains" and are often characterized by their unhygienic and "hillbilly" appearance. 

Chinese people often characterize these workers as "earthy" (tu, 土的). The best way to translate tu is to say that someone is out of style or dressed like a hick from the countryside. They are often dirty and unshowered, overworked, dressed in plain, dark clothes that are not dissimilar to a "Mao suit", and carry big plastic, plaid tote bags with either all of their belongings or plastic bottles to be recycled for a few cents each. I do not believe there is such a noticeable difference between white and blue-collar workers in the States as there is in China, though I do think some comparisons can be drawn in American racial segregation.

Anyway, Xinyi argued that Chinese intellectuals especially discriminate against manual laborers and proposed that everyone in the class dress up like one of these earthy people for a day to see what it feels like to be spat upon by the rest of society. She said, "If a security guard at an apartment complex sees me walk in, he will do nothing to stop me. But if someone dressed very earthy tries to walk in, they will automatically not be permitted inside. This is discrimination and we should be kind to everyone, no matter where they come from." Everyone else disagreed with her. "Would you welcome a recycling collector to eat dinner with you if they knocked on your door?" one student asked incredulously. "Absolutely," she replied. 

Some sections of Old Nanjing will be demolished soon and have big, red graffiti marks reading "搬迁" on them, meaning "relocate." Some of the houses have 拆 chai on them, meaning "demolish." My friend likes to call this "chai-pox" because they paint this huge, red character every couple of feet, and you could say it's not unlike the chicken pox... In addition there are various wallpaper posters tacked to the outside of houses encouraging residents to "relocate as soon as possible." My favorite was one I saw the other day that said, "Be civilized; the quicker you move out, the better" (I didn't have my camera with me). Here is another picture: 

These two columns read:

Left: Construct a good Eastern gate and develop Qinhuai (local Nanjing) Culture [I don't understand what the "Eastern Gate" part means]

Right (bottom): Understand and support urban construction projects

Here is another picture below of a bus stop sign that gives an example of such government-sponsored urgings to be more civilized, especially on public transportation (indeed, I feel that Chinese people are known around the world as having the inability to form a line and being particularly aggressive on busses... or maybe that's just my own experience these past years that have been ingrained in my impression). Anyway, apparently the government has taken note of this and has started a rather aggressive campaign against it. I think in this sense it is an a government attempt to save face (aka to avoid shame), as well as part of their civilizing project.


This sign reads: 

Speak in a civilized manner: break away with the old customs and establish the new; Let's build a new, civilized city together, hand-in-hand

The civilized Nanjingese are lovely people; If you participate too, it will be even more wonderful
Tomba also uses real estate marketing language as an example of the government's civilizing project: "Newly built middle-class residential compounds are often marketed as 'lifestyles' — with community, suzhi, and harmony...as central elements of their marketing strategies."

Here are some pictures of real estate marketing around Nanjing: 

 "A perfect home for a newly married couple, it includes a life of happiness! The house for the newly married couple is for magnificent initiative! 87-104 square meter homes with two or three rooms of happiness are now on the market!"

 "The world citizen's TOP level apartment"

“The model of a large residence for 3 generations to live together: a new international capital to attain better products and housing resources as life's grand finale" (the house advertised here is for 138 square meters, which would probably cost over 1.5 million RMB)



"Let your family revival begin; Republican era mansions are the "selling like hot cakes" (advertising for houses going for 1.2 to 4 million RMB)

The Chinese says, "A New Aristocratic Life"
A picture of foreigners for good measure
These advertisements are huge billboards pasted on the walls of construction sites, seemingly for new apartment complexes.

Chinese word of the day: 

空前- kong4 qian2- literally "empty before", aka unprecedented


[1] Luigi Tomba, "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community: Civilization and the Middle Class in Urban China," Positions: East Asia cultures critique 17 (2009): 597, accessed September 30, 2011, doi: 10.1215/10679847-2009-016.
[2] Tomba, "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community," 597.
[3] Tomba, "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community," 597.
[4] Tomba, "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community," 598.
[5] Tomba, "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community," 599.
[6] Tomba, "Of Quality, Harmony, and Community," 611.
[7] Tao Xidong, "Jiakuai chengshi hexie shequ jianshe jizhi de chongjian yu zaizao" ("Accelerate the reconstruction of the mechanisms for the edification of harmonious communities in the cities"), Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), June 21, 2005.

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